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The legal world was already deeply indebted to Weir: this book much increases those obligations, in rendering accessible Wieacker's masterpiece. It is to be hoped that more treasures of German scholarship will also one day be translated, by Weir himself or others inspired by him. THIS immensely topical book illustrates the struggles of Pakistan in identifying an appropriate constitutional role for the judiciary. These have most recently led the Supreme Court to nullify judicial appointments by the ruling party. In a detailed political and constitutional analysis, Newberg brings out why, created from colonial structures, the process of Pakistani constitution-making has remained incomplete even today. Characterised from the start by autocratic, praetorian models, focused on strong executive power which continues to be prominent today, Pakistan was not allowed to progress to a justice-centred democratic order. The legislative branch, too, tends to act in self-interest. The first Constituent Assembly, unwilling to contemplate its own supersession, turned itself into a permanent non-representative body, overlooking that the business of running a State is not just a matter of ruling, which is one of the democratic lessons that Pakistan has not yet learnt. The existing literature, and now this book, puts the blame for this on the judiciary. This is not only unfair, it is wrong. Newberg repeats the mantra that the judges only protected their own role and have otherwise sided with every dictator who came along, dressing this "slavish" attitude in highbrow jurisprudence. Her final analysis reiterates that the judges have not fully confronted the issue of basic structure (p.242). However, noting that India's judiciary has gone much further (p.238), Newberg is actually worried about giving too much power to the courts. Thus she joins the chorus of those who too quickly decry judicial overstepping of limits. Having criticised executive dictatorship and legislative inertia, she does not say clearly what the judges are supposed to have done better. How can they refine their own supervisory role without appearing to cross limits of constitutional power sharing? Perhaps the confusion lies in
